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Drones are becoming increasingly present into today’s society through many 
different means such as outdoor sports, surveillance, delivery of goods etc. With such a 
rapid increase, a means of control and monitoring is needed as the drones become more 
interconnected and readily available.  Thus, the idea of Internet of drones (IoD) is 
formed, an infrastructure in place to do those types of things.   However, without an 
authentication system in place anyone could gain access or control to real time data to 
multiple drones within an area.   This is a problem that I choose to tackle using a Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that accelerates the k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) 
encryption algorithm making it a hardware component. This will allow me to synthesis 
and implement the three parts of my privacy-aware and hardware-based authentication 
scheme for internet of drones.  I use Vivado and Vivado HLS to obtain results for my 
authentication scheme.   My scheme was able to perform large computational expensive 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
Drones are widely becoming accessible and more active in everyday life.  
(Gharibi) They are being used in transportation of goods, sporting events such as drone 
races, government surveillance, wildfire control, and much more. (Tiberiu, Jung) The 
potential for drones is limitless in their use.  As we progress as a society, so does our 
technology and we are able to interconnect many things and drones are no exception.  
Companies like amazon, UPS, US Department of Transportation and Verge Aero are 
pushing for increasing drone presence to implement fleets of drones to better their 
business and interests. (Tiberiu, Jung, Wisel) 
This is one of the reasons why a secure IoD environment is needed in areas with 
heavy drone activity that is near or in civilian populations.  In addition to the increased 
use of drone activity, so do the risks of hazards and potential threats.  Adversaries can use 
their skills to cause many harmful and potentially deadly attacks to the system in 
unprotective networks.  Some examples of this are drones found spying in private citizens 
property, drug smuggling along the US-Mexico border, and even in bombing attacks via 
attached explosives to the drone. (BBC News) Companies like Amazon risk the locations 
of their drones being made aware, and adversaries can then steal goods that are being 
delivered.  
I propose one solution that could potentially solve some of these problems.  My 
scheme is implemented over an IoD network that requires drones to register before use 
within a system.  The privacy-aware and hardware-based authentication scheme uses the 
kNN encryption algorithm to encrypt the drone’s identification information using a secret 
key.  Each drone gets a unique key that is created by a trusted entity within the system.   
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There are two kNN encryption processes, one done by the drones during an 
authentication request and one by the trusted entity after drone registration.  The 
encrypted identification information that is created by the trusted entity is stored on a 
server to be used later for dot product verification.  When an authentication request is 
made, the drones send their encrypted identification information to the server and then it 
will be verified before any information can be accepted/rejected by the server.  This 
process will make it difficult for adversaries to attempt to infiltrate the system.   
I implement this authentication scheme on a FPGA as a hardware component.  
The FPGA can perform parallel processing, thus accelerating the kNN algorithm.  Since 
this is an added component to the drone, it can be turned off when not in use to save 
power.  Power is one of the major resources of a drone, thus necessary to save as much 
power consumption as possible.  I chose the FPGA because of its ability to be 
reconfigured and is flexibility during use.  When the device is not needed, it can easily be 
powered down.  The other reason for implementing the authentication scheme on this 
device is that the FPGA will take over the computational heavy tasks such as the 
encryption process of the kNN algorithm away from the drones CPU.  This allows the 
drones CPU to focus on other important tasks at hand.   
I was able to accelerate the kNN algorithm and perform large computational tasks 
with exceedingly small computational cost. The dot product search achieved small 
computation costs while having to search through 200 other drones’ encrypted 
identification information uploaded from the trusted entity.  My scheme is very flexible 
and allows for different encryption sizes as well as affordable pricing availability.  Some 
of the components can range from fifty dollars to several thousands of dollars.   
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The rest of this thesis is structured as followed; the background of different topics 
of my work, a literature review of FPGA hardware acceleration and other IoD 
authentication schemes, system model and proposed scheme that goes further in detail of 
the kNN authentication scheme and model, and methodology and procedure on how my 
results were obtained with the different software’s that was used and the discussion and 




CHAPTER I - BACKGROUND 
Field Programmable Gate Array 
FPGA came to be through the creation of programmable logic devices in the 80s. 
What makes the FPGA unique compared to other devices is that its hard-wired 
programming can be reconfigured while other devices have a fixed hardware during the 
manufacture process and cannot be changed. (HardwareBee) This is extremely useful 
when an FPGA has been configured for a certain task and there is something wrong with 
the programming.  The FPGA can simply be reconfigured once the problem has been 
found and fixed.  Today, FPGAs are utilized worldwide for many different aspects such 
as the acceleration of different computational tasks and for development into artificial 
intelligence. (Touger) 
Hardware Acceleration  
Hardware acceleration is a fast-growing process that is being used in many areas 
such as artificial intelligence, video game design, and in my case acceleration of the kNN 
algorithm.  The definition of hardware acceleration is the process of offloading 
computational heavy tasks onto a special device to decrease the computational cost of the 
tasks that would normally take a CPU longer to compute.  The most common devices 
used in hardware acceleration are graphic processing units (GPUs), Field Programmable 
Gate Arrays (FPGAs), and Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). (OmniSci) 
The FPGA hardware acceleration is achieved from its interconnecting logic blocks that 
can perform real time processing in parallel.  The main difference in a CPU and FPGA is 





Parallelism is the process of running several tasks at the same time to achieve 
faster results.  This process is used to speed up the execution of programs by having 
multiple parts of a task split up and assigned to different processes to implement in 
parallel.  Parallel can be performed by using Multi-Core CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs.   
k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm 
The kNN algorithm was created by Evelyn Fix and Joseph Hodges in 1951 and 
then later expanded upon by Thomas Cover.  It is mostly being used in machine learning 
as a classification and regression model, (Peterson).  It is also known as the supervised 
learning algorithm and works by finding similarities between two data points (Analytics 
Vidhya).   
Internet of Drones 
IoD is a layered network control architecture created to maintain control and 
access drones over a network within an area or areas, (Gharibi).   This is used to monitor 
registered drones in an area or areas to reduce risks such as unauthorized use, collision 
hazards, etc. FCC has many requirements for recreational drones and any above 400ft is 
considered uncontrolled airspace. This reduces the risk of private citizen drones flying 
into commercial airliners etc., (Secondary nav.).  There are many new laws being 
implemented to control risks of increasing presence of drones, like the law stated above.   
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
FPGA Hardware Acceleration 
Hardware acceleration is a growing topic in today’s technological world.  This is 
the process in which high computationally expensive tasks are offloaded from the CPU 
onto a hardware component to accelerate the task to improve performance and efficiency.  
Hardware acceleration is common in video games where CPU offloads the video games 
graphics onto the GPU to do most of the work.  This component is built for this type of 
work to allow the CPU to focus on different computational tasks.   Other examples 
include bit mining, artificial intelligence, and DNA mapping.  These are very heavy tasks 
that the hardware acceleration can perform in less time than it would take a single CPU.   
The FPGA is naturally built to accelerate its tasks by the way it is designed.  This is a 
specialized device that can be reconfigured to meet different needs and is capable 
performing parallel processing.   
In Dave et al., they tackled a problem to optimize the matrix-matrix-
multiplication using hardware acceleration through the FPGA and an instruction set 
architecture called PowerPC.  They connect directly to the system memory bus allowing 
for bandwidth up to 800 MB/s. Their software pipelined system would compute the 
matrix multiplication task faster with smaller size matrices but would be less efficient 
compared to the hardware implementation on much large matrix sizes.  Finally, they 
achieved some level of optimization but stated they could further improve on this.  This 
paper is one of the works that I considered when implementing my scheme.  The kNN 
encryption algorithm requires several matric multiplication functions to occur in the 
creation of the encrypted identification indices.   
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Owaida et al. proposed a solution to lowering the latency of data processing 
pipelines using FPGA based hardware acceleration, investigate data processing and 
machine learning in search engine pipelines, and propose an alternative solution through 
FPGA implementation of gradient boosted decision tree ensembles.  This will allow for 
an efficient way to process much larger results while combining distinct parts of the 
process to achieve lower latencies.  They test their scheme by using a large data analytic 
software called H20.  The data for testing is performing multiple queries for the flight 
routes and finding quick results for multiple data points.   Their design implements two 
different techniques to speed up the process of the gradient boosted decision tree and the 
XGboost tree.  Both trees are parallelized including the data sets that hold much of the 
routing information.  Next, it removes overhead from high-rate memory that normally a 
CPU would have, to the memory structures of the FPGA that is highly customizable.  
Their work shows that the FPGA far outclasses the CPU used in their testing by several 
factors.     
Imagine processing is a heavy computational task that is applied to many fields 
such as medical, military, and satellite imaging.  Stratakos et al. take a dive into the use 
of FPGAs in medical imagine processing and optimizing the parts of the process that are 
heavily computational.  They propose a hardware and software implementation of the 
imagine processing where the software application will handle the less computational 
expensive tasks, and the hardware implementation will handle the heavier loads.  The use 
of direct memory access is used to keep a low latency while keeping a high throughput 
between communications of the hardware design and software design. Like Stratakos, 
who had issues where large images would use up all the BLOCKRAMs resources and 
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needed to be downsized, I had issues where I had to downsize the ID size to one that did 
not fill up the FPGA resources.  Finally, they achieved optimizing the imagine processing 
using FPGA devices while proving higher performances when compared to standard 
software implementations during image processing.   
Gielata et al. explore using FPGA hardware acceleration for AES encryption and 
Rijndael algorithm.   They designed a pipeline architecture that would encrypt and 
decrypt the different modules.  In their experimentation the coding modules were 
synthesized and implemented separately from the decoding modules in 10 rounds 
parallel. They were able to achieve a higher throughput than regular software 
implementation of a similar design.  This allowed for a larger amount of data to be 
processed while executing the AES encryption much quicker.  It is worth noting, the 
coding module performed faster with more throughput than the decoding process of the 
encryption algorithm.   
In the work proposed by Ernst et al, they use the FPGA device as a hardware 
component that is connected to PCI.  The FPGA is used to process the EC point 
multiplication function of the elliptic curve public key algorithm.  This is the most 
computational extensive part of the encryption.  Instead of first designing their algorithm 
in C/C++ they take a different approach that generates synthesizable hardware 
descriptions.  This is like Vivado Design suite when creating a block design.  They use 
varying key sizes as well as different FPGA hardware during testing.  Their work was 
greatly increased using the FPGA based Crypto Processor that can generate synthesizable 
VHDL code that is implemented on the FPGA devices to accelerate the elliptical curve 
public key encryption algorithm. 
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Lastly, hardware acceleration is gaining influence in the computational world as 
bigger and harder to solve problems grow.  Image resolutions are becoming quite large 
requiring a considerable number of resources and time to process.  Algorithms and 
equations that once took CPUs a great amount of time to process can now be 
implemented much quicker.  Super computers are being built across the world to solve 
complex problems through parallel computing.  GPUs are increasing with the number of 
resources that can be placed upon on card. This increases its ability to perform much 
better through parallelism by using one of its greatest features, CUDA cores, to perform 
difficult tasks.  FPGAs are becoming increasingly present as the ability to put more 
components together within a small area as well as everything else.  Unlike all these other 
devices, the FPGA is highly customizable to fit different needs as a physical hardware 
component while having high throughputs and executing tasks much quicker than 
standard serial means.   
Encryption schemes for IoD 
Internet of drones is a network architecture that is designed to control unmanned 
aerial vehicles in a controlled airspace.    It is also used to control the information that is 
being communicated throughout the network.    In this part of the literature review I 
explore the different proposed authentication schemes that are attuned for IoD.   A 
comparison of their findings and mine are found in the comparison results section in 
chapter VI of this report.  First, Wazid et al. propose a lightweight remote user 
authentication and key agreement scheme for internet of drones.   
Wazid proposes a scheme for internet of drones that is user-based authentication 
scheme that uses key agreements in the scheme.   They use a one-way hash function and 
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bitwise XOR operation.  On the user side of the authentication scheme, they use fuzzy 
extractor to verify the users’ biometrics.  They boast of being resistant to attacks such as 
privileged-insider and password guessing, impersonation attacks, and a few others.  Their 
scheme is composed of seven phases.  The first step is the server will start the registration 
of all the drones, next users will register with the server.  Then users will login with their 
credentials.  The server will verify the credentials and deny or approve the login. There 
are other phases, but they do not relate to the direct process.  They are for password and 
biometric updates and the addition of other drones to the system.  The computational cost 
of their scheme on the server side is 2.56 ms while my scheme is in microseconds.  Next, 
Srinivas et al. propose a lightweight authentication scheme for IoD that uses Temporal 
Credential-Based Anonymous and applies real-or-random models.   
Srinivas scheme works by only allowing register users to use the services of the 
drones that are already registered with the server.  Just like Wazid’s scheme all drones are 
preregistered with the server.  In this scheme all the remote drones have unique keys that 
are used in the authentication process.  Srinivas scheme applies a three-factor technique 
that includes smart cards, user passwords and biometrics.  They use a one-way hash 
function and apply fuzzy extractor during the biometric verification process of the 
scheme.   
As previously stated, this authentication scheme has similar steps to Wazid, pre-
deployment, user registration, login and authentication, and stages to update user 
information, add new drones, and replace items that were stollen or lost.  Srinivas boast 
to protect against attacks such as stolen devices, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-
middle attacks and many more.  The approximation of the server-side computational time 
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for their scheme is 2.88ms seconds which is slightly slower than the earlier scheme 
reviewed above.   The next paper proposes a lightweight authenticated key exchange 
protocol for IoD.   
Tanveer et al. propose a lightweight authentication scheme that uses key exchange 
protocol that they label as LAKE.  This scheme is composed of six phases that are like 
previously described schemes: registration, user authentication and key exchange, update 
user information and biometrics, and the ability to add more drones to the scheme.   Their 
scheme uses a well-known authentication process as AEGIS encryption scheme.  They 
also use a one-way hash function and bitwise XOR operations in their scheme.   Tanveer 
boast that their authentication schemes protect from attacks such as password and 
biometric update attacks, offline password-guessing, identity-guessing attacks, and 
others.  Note that Tanveer uses a larger hash function than both Wazid and Srinivas but 
require less computational overhead in their server-side encryption.  The server-side 
computational cost that Tanveer claims is 0.174 ms.  Finally, the last paper proposes a 
lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme for Iod.  
Zhang et al. propose a similar one-way hash function and bitwise XOR 
operations, that happen when the drones and users mutually authenticate one another.  
They boast their scheme can potentially withstand various attacks such as impersonation, 
server spoofing, drone capture etc. Their scheme is composed of four phases: setup, user 
registration, drone registration and lastly authentication.    
As a final note, a strong authentication scheme is necessary in the IoD 
environment.  This reduces the risk of adversaries trying to infiltrate the system to do 
harm within and without the architecture.  Thus, having various parts of the scheme 
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passed on as a hardware component specialized in parallel processing will allow for 
larger throughput with lower latency times.   This is recognized in the results section of 
this report where I make a comparison of similar works to my own. I also compare the 
server side of my work as if it were compiled on the Kintex 116 FPGA, Nexys A7-100T 
FPGA, MatLAB and Visual Studios 2019 Enterprise.  
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CHAPTER III – SYSTEM MODEL 
Network Model 
The network model is composed of three main entities that work together to 
achieve one goal, a privacy-aware and hardware-based authentication scheme for IoD.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Network Model of Authentication Scheme 
The three main entities as shown in the above figure are the remote drones, registration 
authority (RA) and the Authentication server. The network tower is purely 
communication purposes within this scheme. The first entity is the remote drone that 
must register with the registration authority before it can perform any kind of tasks within 
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the IoD area. Once this step is complete the drone can make a request to the 
authentication server when information needs to be passed along or requested. Before a 
request can be sent, the remote drone must perform the kNN algorithm on its 
identification information to create an encrypted identification index E(q) that can be sent 
to the authentication server for verification. The second entity is the registration authority 
whose sole purpose is to take in drone identification information, encrypt such 
information using kNN algorithm, upload encrypted identification index E(pi) for all 
drones registered to the authentication server, and create and distribute keys to all drones. 
The last entity is the authentication server, which functions as verification check and 
storage for all drone encrypted identification indices E(pi). The authentication server will 
receive the encrypted identification information index E(q) from the drone and perform 
the dot product search between it and all drone stored encrypted identification indices 
E(pi) received from the RA. If a match is found the drone can then send or request 
information to the authentication server, however, if the server does not find a match the 
drone will no longer be able to send any information over the network.  
Threat Model 
The types of threats my scheme will face are attackers that are “honest but 
curious.”  This will come from inside advisories within the authentication scheme such as 
the authentication server or other drones. “Honest but curious” means that the attackers 
will follow the proper protocols of the scheme and will not try to change it or deviate 
from the process. However, they will try to gain insight and learn all information possible 
throughout the scheme. This includes information such as the keys used in the kNN 
algorithm that are created and distributed by the RA and the drone’s identification 
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information. The purpose of this authentication scheme is to keep adversaries that are 
described above from gaining access to such information so that the system and its 
information remains private.   
Design Goals 
In this section the three design goals are defined here as well as how they apply to 
this authentication scheme. 
Scalability and Efficiency 
The scheme must be able to perform the dot product search over a large amount 
of data in a short bit of time.  In this case, the index search is performed using two 
hundred different drone encrypted identifications information E(pi) from the RA. The 
experiment used varying sizes of encrypted data between 1.024 kbits and 101.032 kbits 
depending on which FPGA device that is implementing the search.   
Confidentiality Identification Information 
Important identification information that is passed between the RA to 
authentication server or drone to authentication server should be confidential and private 
from adversaries trying to gain insight on its contents.  This information is hidden inside 
the encrypted indices created via all drones and RA making it difficult for advisories to 
decipher.   
Unlinkability of Authentication Request 
Inside the kNN encryption process for the remote drones, random numbers are 
generated during the encryption of the identification information.  Each time a drone 
makes a request to the authentication server different random numbers are created 
making no two-authentication request alike thus unlinkable.    
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CHAPTER IV – Proposed Scheme 
Overview 
A brief overview of the proposed scheme is defined below. 
1) Drone Registration: Drone gives unique identification information to 
registration authority.  This is in the form of a binary vector.  
2) Key Distribution: Registration authority creates and gives each drone a unique 
key. 
3) RA Identification Encryption: Registration authority performs kNN encryption 
algorithm on drones’ identification information creating the index E(pi).   
4) Upload of Index from RA: The registration authority uploads all drones’ 
encrypted identification information to the authentication server. 
5) Authentication Request: Once a drone has received the key from the RA, it can 
now use the key to encrypt its identification information using kNN algorithm.  
This creates the E(q) encrypted index that is sent to the authentication server 
during a request.   
6) Dot Product Index Search: Once the authentication server receives the drones 
encrypted index E(q), it takes the drones encrypted index E(q) and performs dot 
product on all stored indices E(pi) to find a match. 
7) Authentication Results: If a match is found, the server will then accept the 
authentication request allowing the drone to receive or give information to and 
from the authentication server.  If denied, the drone will no longer be able to send 




Scheme A.1 Proposed Authentication Scheme 
Drone Registration 
The first step of the authentication scheme is registration of the drone with the 
RA. The drone must give the RA its unique identification information q. In the 
implementation of this in Vivado HLS, the q is a binary vector and is tested using varied 
sizes: 4, 32, 64, 128, 256, and 512.  The varied sizes allow for various levels of 
encryption. The Nexys FPGA can only handle sizes of 256 and below.   
Key Distribution 
Once the RA receives the drone’s identification q it will create the parts of the key 
that is used in its own implementation of the kNN encryption and the drones.  First, a 
binary vector S is created of size n. The n is determined by the size of q. The first six 
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matrices are arrays type double composed of variables between 0.01 and 1 labeled (m1, 
m2, n1, n2, n3, n4).   These random numbers are created by using a seeded 32-bit Mersenne 
Twister, mt19937.  The seeded numbers in the experiment can be replaced with variables 
such as the internal temperatures of the board at that time during process.  These matrices 
and the binary vector are what the registration authority will use to create its key that will 
be used to encrypt the drones’ identification information before it is uploaded to the 
authentication server.  Thus, the RA’s key is composed of [S, m1n1, m1n2, m2n3, m2n4].  
Next, the secret key for the drone is created using the inverse of the matrices 






-1).  Also, for each of the drones' key, 









-1 =  𝑚𝑖
′′′ + 𝑚𝑖










RA Identification Information Encryption and Upload 
The next step of the proposed scheme is the RA’s application of the kNN 
encryption to the drones ‘identification information.  After encryption, the RA will 
upload the encrypted indices to the server for each drone registered.  First, the RA 
receives the unique id of the drone that is labeled pi and sent to the split function to create 
two row arrays 𝑝𝑖
′[𝑘], 𝑝𝑖
′′[𝑘]. The S vector is also sent into the split function and performs 
the following tasks:    
for k < size of S, k++ 
 if (S[k] == 1) 
  𝑝𝑖
′[𝑘] = 𝑝𝑖[𝑘] 
  𝑝𝑖
′′[𝑘] = 𝑝𝑖[𝑘] 




′[𝑘] = random number (0.01 and 1) 
  𝑝𝑖
′′[𝑘] = 𝑝𝑖[𝑘] – 𝑝𝑖
′[𝑘] 
After the 𝑝𝑖 has been split the RA will perform matrix multiplication four times to 
create four indices of the same size as pi which is shown in the following equations 
below.       
𝐼1 = 𝑝𝑖
′  𝑥 (𝑚1 𝑥 𝑛1) 
𝐼2 = 𝑝𝑖
′ 𝑥 (𝑚1 𝑥 𝑛2) 
𝐼3 = 𝑝𝑖
′′ 𝑥 (𝑚2 𝑥 𝑛3) 
𝐼4 = 𝑝𝑖
′′ 𝑥 (𝑚2 𝑥 𝑛4) 
Then all four indices are combined into one index that is now size n x 4.  This index is 
labeled E(pi) = [I1, I2, I3, I4] and is uploaded to the authentication server, where it will be 
stored with all other drones’ encrypted indices.   
Authentication Request via Drone 
Once a drone is registered it can now encrypt its identification information q 
using the key given by the RA. The drone only encrypts its identification information 
when making an authentication request.  If a request is needed the following will occur.  
The drone’s identification information q is sent into a similar split function as used in the 
RA to create two row vectors 𝑞′ and 𝑞′′.  The following will occur inside the split 
function which is shown below in the following pseudo code.   
for k < size of S, k++ 
 if (S[k] == 0) //different from RA 
  𝑞′[𝑘]= 𝑞[𝑘] 
  𝑞′′[𝑘] = 𝑞[𝑘] 
 else if (S[k] == 1) //different from RA 
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  𝑞′[𝑘]  = random number (0.01 and 1) 
  𝑞′′[𝑘] = 𝑞[𝑘] – 𝑞′[𝑘] 
Next, the two row vectors are transposed into column vectors 𝑞′𝑇and 𝑞′′𝑇. Then, the four 
column indices of size n are created using matric multiplication, as shown in the 
equations below.  
𝑇1 = (𝑛1
−1 𝑥 𝑚𝑖
′) 𝑥  𝑞′𝑇 
𝑇2 = (𝑛2
−1 𝑥 𝑚𝑖
′′) 𝑥 𝑞′𝑇 
𝑇3 = (𝑛3
−1 𝑥 𝑚𝑖
′′′) 𝑥 𝑞′′𝑇 
𝑇4 = (𝑛4
−1 𝑥 𝑚𝑖
′′′′) 𝑥 𝑞′′𝑇 
Finally, the four indices are combined in to one index E(q) = [T1, T2, T3, T4].  
Then the encrypted index E(q) is sent to the authentication server for verification. 
Authentication Process and results 
In this step the authentication server will receive an authentication request from 
the remote drone over the network.  The authentication server has previously stored all 
encrypted identification information from the RA. The authentication server will perform 
dot product multiplication on all saved indices E(pi), with that of the drone’s encrypted 
authentication request E(q).   The server does this until a match is found, and then sends 
the results through the network.   The server will either accept or reject the request 
depending on if there was a match in the dot product of the two indices.  If accepted the 
server will allow the remote drone to send its information to the server.   If it is rejected, 
the server will send a message saying this drone is not authenticated and does not accept 




CHAPTER V – METHODOLOGY 
Overview of Experiments 
Vivado HLS takes two C/C++ files for the source and testbench, these are the 
main code and top-level function code that implements the kNN encryption and the Dot-
Product Index Search.  Three separate instances of Vivado HLS are implemented in my 
design, the Drone Encryption, the Registration Authority Encryption, and the Dot-
Product Index Search.  The top function is the Matrix multiplication function for the kNN 
encryption and the dot-product function for the search portion of the scheme.  This means 
that those functions are the top-level functions of the FPGA device.  The source is where 
the other functions and main function of the code is located.  
Software 
This is the software I used to implement my experiments and performed extensive 
testing.   
MatLAB 
MatLAB is a platform for numeric computing and programming that is used to 
analyze data, develop several types of algorithms, and create models within the software.    
The kNN algorithm used in my scheme was first implemented in MatLAB and developed 
by Ahmed Sheriff.  I used this software to crosscheck my work to verify that it produced 
the same results that I did.  I was tasked with taking this code an converting it into C/C++ 
and then implementing it in my privacy-aware and hardware-based accelerated 






Visual studio is an integrated development environment (IDE) used in software 
development.  I used this as an intermediate before implementing my code in Vivado 
HLS.  This is the first IDE in which I was able to verify my C/C++ results to that of the 
MatLAB implementation of the kNN algorithm.  I was able to perform my code in this 
IDE before moving on to the next step. 
Vivado HLS 
Vivado HLS is a high-level synthesis design tool that allows C and C++ code to 
be converted into Verilog and VHDL and then implemented onto an FPGA as hardwired 
code.  This software will automatically accelerate parts of the code to further lower the 
computational cost through parallelism.  Vivado HLS also allows the user to simulate 
results through synthesis, co-synthesis, and implementation.  This is where timing, 
latency, utilization can be outputted for many different FPGA devices.  Further, files can 
be created for Vivado Design suite to acquire even more data on the implementation of 
different designs. 
Vivado Design Suite  
This is a design suite that was created by Xilinx for the synthesis, implementation, 
and analysis of HDL designs.  This software allows many functions and analysis such as 
power usage, utilizations, timing, and design implementations and schematics.  I used this 
software to produce theoretical results of how much power my authentication scheme 
consumes, different timings results, as well as the different resources used in each 
instance of the scheme.  Instances such as increasing the ID size also increase the number 




I tested the kNN algorithm encryption and search function simulating two 
different FPGA devices, the Kintex 116 UltraScale+ and the Nexys A7-100T. These two 
devices are on opposite ends of each other, meaning that the cost and available resources 
of the Kintex far outweighs that of the Nexys.  This is shown in the results sections of 
each device utilization under the row of available resources.  The cost of each board is 
$2,995 for the Kintex and $229.99 for the Nexys.  A brief description of the resources 
used in my experiments is shown below: 
• BRAM_18K:  This is a dual-port random access memory module that is 
on the FPGA board.  It is used to store large sets of data and each module 
can store 18 kilobits of data.  The dual-port is important because this 
allows for parallel same-clock-cycle access to these various locations in 
memory. (Xilinx documentation) 
• DSP48E: This is an arithmetic logic unit that is embedded into the FPGA 
board.  It is composed of an Add/Subtract unit connected to a multiplier 
that is connected to a final add/subtract/accumulate engine.  Most 
importantly this allows a single unit to perform the following function A 
+= X*Y, which is a function used allow in this scheme.   
• FF:  This a flip flop that includes data input, clock input, clock enable, 
reset and data output.   
• LUT: Look up tables that are connected to the FF. This is a table that 
generates the output based on the inputs received.   
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The first steps in creating this experiment are too open Vivado HLS and choose 
which FPGA device will be used during experimentation.  Then the C/C++ files can be 
imported or created into the design.  Then a top function is chosen from the source file.  
Lastly, a solution folder is created, this is where all csim, implementation and synthesis 
information are stored.  Csim is used to test the results of the experiment and that the 
correct values are shown, C Synthesis starts the source code, C/RTL Cosimulation 
verifies the RTL output and finally Export RTL packages the RTL into an IP output that 
can be opened in Vivado Design Suite.   
Synthesis and Export RTL 
Once the correct files and parameters have been setup in Vivado HLS the testing 
phase can begin.  This is where I can acquire information such as Latency, Number of 
Cycles, Utilization, Power consumption and much more.  The following identification 
information sizes were tested in this authentication scheme. 
• ID array of 4 elements type double 
o Creates an encrypted index of 16 elements type double 
▪ Size in bits: 4,096 bits 
• ID array of 32 elements type double 
o Creates an encrypted index of 128 elements type double 
▪ Size in bits: 8,192 bits 
• ID array of 64 elements type double 
o Creates an encrypted index of 256 elements type double 
▪ Size in bits: 16,384 bits 
• ID array of 128 elements type double 
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o Creates an encrypted index of 512 elements type double 
▪ Size in bits: 32,768 bits 
• ID array of 256 elements type double 
o Creates an encrypted index of 1024 elements type double 
▪ Size in bits: 65,536 bits 
• ID array of 512 elements type double 
o Creates an encrypted index of 2048 elements type double 
▪ Size in bits: 131,072 bits 
Using any larger ID sizes risk using up all the memory in the lower-end FPGA 
devices, the Nexys can only achieve index encryption sizes slightly above 256 before it 
can no longer store anything in block ram memory.  In the results section, most graphs 
have encrypted index size in kilobits, this means the size of the experiment I was 
performing at that time while either creating an encrypted index of that size or searching 
through encrypted indices of that size.  Vivado HLS allows the user to test multiple 
solutions in the same project, in this case, each size change of the identification 
information is a new solution with its own simulation and implementation reports.  This 
also applies to when testing is done on a different FPGA device.  The following occurs 
when running this experiment.   
1) CSIM: if you have printed statements in the code to verify results it will 
print them in a console. 
2) C Synthesis: This gets the source code started in Vivado HLS and will 
produce reports for utilization, latency, and more.  This is shown in the 
results section of the report. 
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3) Next, Cosimulation is ran, this verifies the RTL output of the code. 
4) Lastly, the Export RTL is in setup only and for VHDL.  This will create an 
IP output file labeled project.  This file can be opened in Vivado Design 
suite and is where the power consumption can be obtained.  This will also 
allow for design schematics and show visual representations of the 
resources used on the board.   
The latency that is reported is the total amount time that it takes to perform the kNN 
encryption of the index or the dot product search.  It is measured in unites of time and is 
calculated by the number of clock cycles it takes for an operation to perform.  Where 
there is no data dependency, I apply loop unrolling using the #pragma HLS UNROLL.  
This will allow for parallelism in functions that are not dependent on other variables.  
There is a noticeable difference in speed if not using this #pragma in the experiments.   
Implementation System 
The system that I implemented my work on is a i9-9900k @ 3.60 GHz with 8 
cores and 16 threads total.  It has 32 GB of 3200 MHz of ram and a NVIDIA GTX 1080 
Graphics card that supports 2560 CUDA cores.  Lastly, the main implementation 
software; Vivado HLS, Vivado Design Suite, MatLAB and Visual Studios is installed on 





Results of Kintex 116 
Table 5.1 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Utilization 1.024kBits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 133 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1043 1188 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 565 0 
Register 0 0 680 0 0 
Total 4 25 1723 1886 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.42 1.37 0.40 0.87 0 
 
Table 5.2 Kintex 116 Search of Index Utilization 1.024kBits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 355 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 744 985 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 77 0 
Register 0 0 217 0 0 
Total 4 14 961 1417 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.417 0.768 0.221 0.653 0.000 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 represent the kNN encryption process and index dot-product 
search results of an encrypted index size, 16 elements of type double using the Kintex 





Table 5.3 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Utilization 8.194 kBits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 1049 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1043 1188 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 2757 0 
Register 0 0 3864 0 0 
Total 4 25 4907 4994 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.42 1.37 1.13 2.30 0 
 
Table 5.4 Kintex 116 Search of Index Utilization 8.194 kBits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 357 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 744 985 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 77 0 
Register 0 0 223 0 0 
Total 4 14 967 1419 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.417 0.768 0.223 0.654 0.000 
 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 represent the kNN encryption process and index dot-product 
search results of an encrypted index size, 128 elements of type double using the Kintex 






Table 5.5 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Utilization 16.384 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 2327 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1043 1188 0 
Memory 15 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 4209 0 
Register 0 0 6850 0 0 
Total 15 25 7893 7724 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 1.56 1.37 1.82 3.56 0 
 
Table 5.6 Kintex 116 Search of Index Utilization 16.384 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 358 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 744 985 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 77 0 
Register 0 0 225 0 0 
Total 4 14 969 1420 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.417 0.768 0.223 0.654 0.000 
 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 represent the kNN encryption process and index dot-product 
search results of an encrypted index size, 256 elements of type double using the Kintex 
116.  As shown in the tables, the devices resources are still only slightly increasing for 





Table 5.7 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Utilization 32.768 kbits 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 5213 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1043 1188 0 
Memory 57 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 6030 0 
Register 0 0 13514 0 0 
Total 57 25 14557 12431 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 5.94 1.37 3.35 5.73 0 
 
Table 5.8 Kintex 116 Search of Index Utilization 32.768 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 359 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 744 985 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 77 0 
Register 0 0 227 0 0 
Total 4 14 971 1421 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.417 0.768 0.224 0.655 0.000 
 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 represent the kNN encryption process and index dot-product 
search results of an encrypted index size, 512 elements of type double using the Kintex 
116.  As shown in both tables, the devices resources are steadily increasing for the kNN 





Table 5.9 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Utilization 65.536 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 11615 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 980 1130 0 
Memory 228 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 9774 0 
Register 0 0 27037 0 0 
Total 228 25 28017 22519 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 23.75 1.37 6.46 10.38 0 
 
Table 5.10 Kintex 116 Search of Index Utilization 65.536 kbits 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 360 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 744 985 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 77 0 
Register 0 0 229 0 0 
Total 4 14 973 1422 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.417 0.768 0.224 0.655 0.000 
 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 represent the kNN encryption process and index dot-product 
search results of an encrypted index size, 1024 elements of type double using the Kintex 
116.  As shown in both tables, the kNN encryption process utilization is increasing while 





Table 5.11 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Utilization 131.072 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 25697 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 980 1130 0 
Memory 912 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 16758 0 
Register 0 0 53650 0 0 
Total 912 25 54630 43585 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 95.00 1.37 12.59 20.09 0 
 
Table 5.12 Kintex 116 Search of Index Utilization 131.072 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT URAM 
DSP 0 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 361 0 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 744 985 0 
Memory 4 0 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 77 0 
Register 0 0 231 0 0 
Total 4 14 975 1423 0 
Available 960 1824 433920 216960 64 
Utilization (%) 0.417 0.768 0.225 0.656 0.000 
 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 represent the kNN encryption process and index dot-product 
search results of an encrypted index size, 2048 elements of type double using the Kintex 
116.  As shown in both tables, the kNN encryption process utilization is reaching its max 
resources for block ram while the dot-product index search resources are only slightly 




Table 5.13 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Latency and Power Consumption 
size (kbits) Latency (s) Power Consumption(W) 
1.024 0.00000547 0.053 
8.167 0.001764 0.07 
16.384 0.013604 0.084 
32.768 0.107 0.13 
65.536 0.754 0.223 
131.072 6.21 0.42 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Kintex 116 Utilization Comparison of Encryption of Index 
Table 5.13 is composed of the total latency calculations and power consumptions 
for all encrypted index sizes that were tested.  Figure 5.1 represents the total utilization 
resources that were consumed for each encrypted index size during the kNN encryption 
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Figure 5.2 Kintex 116 Utilization Comparison for Encrypted Index Search 
 
Figure 5.3 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Latency graph 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 represent the total utilization of the Dot-Product index search 
and the representation of the latency as the encrypted index sizes are increased.   
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Figure 5.4 Kintex 116 Encryption of Index Power Consumption 
 
Table 5.14 Kintex 116 Dot-Product Index Search Latency and Power Consumption 
size (kbits) Latency (s) Power Consumption (W) 
1.024 1.78E-6 0.028 
8.167 14.10E-6 0.028 
16.384 28.18E-6 0.028 
32.768 56.34E-6 0.028 
65.536 113.00E-6 0.028 
131.072 225.00E-6 0.028 
 
Figures 5.4 represent the power consumption of the kNN encryption process as 
the encrypted index size is increased.  Table 5.14 represents the total latency’s calculated 
and power consumptions calculations during the dot-product index search as the 
encrypted index size is increased.  Finally, Figure 5.5 represents the Kintex 116 how the 
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Results of Nexys A7-100T 
Table 5.15 Nexys A7-100T Encryption of Index Utilization 1.024 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 137 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1143 1225 
Memory 4 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 646 
Register 0 0 1078 0 
Total 4 25 2221 2008 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 1.48 10.42 1.75 3.17 
 
Table 5.16 Nexys A7-100T Search of Index Utilization 1.024 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 356 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 826 1021 
Memory 4 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 107 
Register 0 0 454 0 
Total 4 14 1280 1484 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 1.481 5.833 1.009 2.341 
 
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 represent the total utilization of resources for the Nexys A7-
100T during the kNN encryption process and the Dot-Product index search.  The 





Table 5.17 Nexys A7-100T Encryption of Index Utilization 8.192 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 1049 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1143 1225 
Memory 4 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 3098 
Register 0 0 4254 0 
Total 4 25 5397 5372 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 1.48 10.42 4.26 8.47 
 
Table 5.18 Nexys A7-100T Search of Index Utilization 8.192 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 361 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 826 1021 
Memory 4 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 107 
Register 0 0 460 0 
Total 4 14 1286 1489 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 1.481 5.833 1.014 2.349 
 
Tables 5.17 and 5.18 represent the total utilization of resources for the Nexys A7-
100T during the kNN encryption process and the Dot-Product index search.  The 
encrypted index size is 128 elements of type double.  As shown above, the Dot-Product 
index search slightly increases while the kNN encryption process utilization is steadily 




Table 5.19 Nexys A7-100T Encryption of Index Utilization 16.384 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 2327 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1143 1225 
Memory 16 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 4278 
Register 0 0 7560 0 
Total 16 25 8703 7830 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 5.93 10.42 6.86 12.35 
 
Table 5.20 Nexys A7-100T Search of Index Utilization 16.384 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 362 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 826 1021 
Memory 4 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 107 
Register 0 0 462 0 
Total 4 14 1288 1490 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 1.481 5.833 1.016 2.350 
 
Tables 5.19 and 5.20 represent the total utilization of resources for the Nexys A7-
100T during the kNN encryption process and the Dot-Product index search.  The 
encrypted index size is 256 elements of type double.  As shown above, the Dot-Product 
index search slightly increases while the kNN encryption process utilization is steadily 




Table 5.21 Nexys A7-100T Encryption of Index Utilization 32.768 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 5213 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1143 1225 
Memory 64 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 6103 
Register 0 0 14430 0 
Total 64 25 15573 12541 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 23.70 10.42 12.28 19.78 
 
Table 5.22 Nexys A7-100T Search of Index Utilization 32.768 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 363 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 826 1021 
Memory 4 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 107 
Register 0 0 464 0 
Total 4 14 1290 1491 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 1.481 5.833 1.017 2.352 
 
Tables 5.21 and 5.22 represent the total utilization of resources for the Nexys A7-
100T during the kNN encryption process and the Dot-Product index search.  The 
encrypted index size is 512 elements of type double.  As shown above, the Dot-Product 
index search slightly increases while the kNN encryption process utilization is steadily 




Table 5.23 Nexys A7-100T Encryption of Index Utilization 65.536 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 11615 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 25 1143 1225 
Memory 256 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 9798 
Register 0 0 28056 0 
Total 256 25 29199 22638 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 94.81 10.42 23.03 35.71 
 
Table 5.24 Nexys A7-100T Search of Index Utilization 65.536 kbits 
Name BRAM_18K DSP48E FF LUT 
DSP 0 0 0 0 
Expression 0 0 0 364 
FIFO 0 0 0 0 
Instance 0 14 826 1021 
Memory 4 0 0 0 
Multiplexer 0 0 0 107 
Register 0 0 466 0 
Total 4 14 1292 1492 
Available 270 240 126800 63400 
Utilization (%) 1.481 5.833 1.019 2.353 
 
Tables 5.23 and 5.24 represent the total utilization of resources for the Nexys A7-
100T during the kNN encryption process and the Dot-Product index search.  The 
encrypted index size is 1024 elements of type double.  As shown above, the Dot-Product 
index search slightly increases while the kNN encryption process utilization reaching its 
max resources available in the block ram.   The Nexys is only able to encrypt indices 
sizes 256 elements of type double and below.   
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Table 5.25 Nexys A7-100T Encryption of Index Latency and Power Consumption 
size (kbits) Latency (s) Power Consumption(W) 
1.024 0.00000687 0.077 
8.167 0.002141 0.103 
16.384 0.016621 0.15 
32.768 0.133 0.337 
65.536 1.097  0.337 
 
Table 5.26 Nexys A7-100T Search of Index Latency and Power Consumption 
size (kbits) Latency (s) Power Consumption (W) 
1.024 2.27E-6 0.051 
8.167 17.95E-6 0.053 
16.384 35.87E-6 0.054 
32.768 71.71E-6 0.054 
65.536 143.00E-6 0.054 
 
Tables 5.25 and 5.26 represent the total latency’s calculated and power consumed 
during each instance of the kNN encryption process and Dot-Product index search from 
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Figure 5.6 Nexys A7-100T Utilization Comparison of Encryption of Index 
 
Figure 5.7 Nexys A7-100T Utilization Comparison of Index Search 
 
Figure 5.8 Nexys A7-100T Latency Comparison of Index Encryption 
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In figures 5.7 and 5.8, the first represents the resource utilization during the index 
search while the other represents the latency as the encrypted index size is increased.   
 


















































Figure 5.10 Nexys A7-100T Power Consumption Comparison of Index Encryption 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 represent the latency in the index search and power 
consumption in the index encryption process as the encrypted index size is increased 
from 16 elements to 1024 elements of type double.   
 
Figure 5.11 Nexys A7-100T Power Consumption Comparison of Index Search 
Figure 5.11 represents the power consumption during the index search as the 





































Table 5.27 Execution time of index search comparisons of different IDEs (in seconds) 
Size Matlab Visual Studios Kintex Nexys 
1.024 0.000807 0.0020 0.00000178 0.00000227 
8.167 0.032 0.0040 0.0000141 0.00001795 
16.384 0.126 0.0070 0.00002818 0.00003587 
32.768 0.591 0.0140 0.00005634 0.00007171 
65.536 2.3 0.0250 0.000113 0.000143 
131.072 9 0.0500 0.000225 N/A 
 
Table 5.28 Execution time of index encryption IDE comparison (in seconds) 
size MatLAB Visual Studios Kintex Nexys 
1.024 0.000064 0.0002 0.00000547 0.00000687 
8.167 0.000142 0.003 0.001764 0.002141 
16.384 0.000424 0.008 0.013604 0.016621 
32.768 0.00101 0.048 0.107 0.133 
65.536 0.003753 0.377 0.754 1.097 
131.072 0.0134 2.74 6.21 N/A 
 
 
Tables 5.27 and 5.28 represent the latency’s of both the kNN encryption process 
and the Dot-Product search implemented on MatLAB, Visual Studios, Kintex 116 FPGA, 
and the Nexys A7-100T FPGA.  
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CHAPTER VI – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Comparison of other works 
My scheme is much faster than other similar authentication schemes for IoD.  
This is achieved by having a hardware component that offsets heavy computational tasks 
onto a specialized device, the FPGA.  Where you need a GPUs or multiple cores to 
parallel certain functions the FPGA is naturally built for it because of its architecture.   
 










































Figure 6.2 Proposed scheme (Kintex) comparison of results of server-side computational 
cost 
I used the results from the Nexys A7-100T in figure 6.1 and Kintex 116 in figure 
6.2 in the comparison of an encrypted identification size of 512 elements of type double.  
The dot product search was performed against 200 encrypted indices of the same size.  









































Figure 6.3 Implementation comparisons of dot-product Search 
 
In Figure 6.3 is a compassion of the implementation of the dot product search on 
MatLAB, visual studios and the two FPGA devices using encrypted index sizes of 16, 
128, 256, and 512.  The 1024 and 2048 sizes were not included in this chart because the 
latency would cause the Kintex, Nexys, and Visual studio results to look like they were at 
zero.  Also, 2048 was not used because the Nexys cannot encrypt indies that large.  The 
chart shows that the FPGA devices outperformed Visual Studios and MatLAB and the 


















Implementing the kNN algorithm on an FPGA device had some challenges and 
limitations from the software and hardware itself.  The Vivado HLS software had some 
limitations such as no pointers to pointers, pointers to functions, no dynamic memory 
where everything had to be bounded, and no recursive functions etc. The csim function in 
Vivado had limitations when implementing large matrices within the design.  However, 
the Vivado HLS could still synthesis and implement the kNN algorithm spite of this 
limitation.   
Conclusion 
I was able to simulate the different components of my proposed scheme using 
Vivado HLS and Vivado Design Suite.  My results show that my scheme computational 
cost of the search performed much quicker than other similar schemes.  The 
authentication scheme is flexible and efficient and can meet the needs of different 
consumers by choosing different FPGA devices to implement the Hardware Accelerated 
kNN Authentication Scheme.  This is necessary for users that need cheaper means of 
security and do not need higher levels of encryption that require more FPGA resources 
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